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Resource Allocation Games in Interference Relay Channels
Elena Veronica Belmega, Brice Djeumou and Samson Lasaulce
Abstract— In this paper we study a distributed network
comprising an interference channel in parallel with an inter-
ference relay channel. Therefore each source node can use
two frequency bands and has to implement a certain power
allocation policy. An example of application of such a model
is the case where the performance of terminals operating in
unlicensed bands would be enhanced by being allowed to exploit
an additional frequency band in which a relay is available. In
this network model, each user is selfish and wants to maximize
its Shannon transmission rate. We analyze two cases. In the first
case, the relaying node is assumed to implement an amplify-and-
forward (AF) protocol while in the second case it implements
the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol introduced by Cover
and El Gamal. For both cases we analyze the existence and
uniqueness issues of the equilibrium of the aforementioned
power allocation games. Several interesting and new results are
provided. In particular: 1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium
is shown to be always guaranteed in the case of the AF
protocol; 2. The performance of a user or the network does not
necessarily increase with the transmit power available at the
relay; 3. We show that there is naturally a game in interference
relay channels (even if the power allocation policy is fixed)
when the DF protocol is used; this game is induced by the
decentralized choice of the cooperation degree between each
source node and the relay node.
Index Terms— Game theory, information theory, cognitive
radio, interference channel, open spectrum access, power allo-
cation game, relay channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, spectrum congestion has be-
come more and more a critical issue. This is one of the
reasons why major actors in this arena like the Federal
Communications Commission has released important reports
providing a legal framework for deploying technologies
like ultra wideband [1] or cognitive radio [2]. The latter
technology has benefited from a more general consensus
in part because its way of re-using the spectrum generates
much less interference than ultra wideband systems. Cogni-
tive terminals, based on spectrum sensing capabilities, are
envisioned to be able to opportunistically and efficiently
re-exploit the spectrum “left-overs” of other systems. In
particular, more and more wireless devices operate in unli-
censed bands, which gives to cognitive terminals a particular
interest in locally exploiting the unused spectral resources,
for instance, to increase their individual transmission rate
or quality of communication. The technical issues addressed
in this paper fall within this framework. More specifically,
our main motivation is to acquire a better understanding of
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a system where two cognitive transmitters, each of them
communicating with its respective receiver, are offered the
opportunity to use an additional frequency band on which a
relaying node is available to further increase the performance
of the system. In order to analyze such a distributed system
we exploit both game theory, which offers the theoretical
framework to study the interaction between several decision
makers, and information theory, which allows us to char-
acterize the performance limits of a communication system
and therefore to study a network of terminals implementing
good codes. Indeed, we assume that the two transmitters
can choose freely their own resource allocation policy in
order to selfishly maximize their transmission rates and,
for this purpose, compete for the additional frequency band
and thus for the available relay node. Several key questions
arise: What is the influence of the relaying protocol on the
game formulation? Is there a predictable state (equilibrium)
at which this system will operate? Is it unique?
The system under investigation is modeled by a frequency
non-selective (FNS) interference channel (IC) [3] in parallel
with an FNS interference relay channel (IRC) [4], [5]. To the
best authors’ knowledge, the closest contributions to those
presented in this paper are [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. In [6]
the authors consider the multiuser power control problem
in a frequency-selective IC, which is modeled as a non-
cooperative game where the players want to maximize their
individual transmission rate. In [7] the authors study the
same channel but in their formulation each user selfishly
minimize its transmit power under a minimal achievable rate
constraint. In [4], [5] the authors introduce the IRC and
focus on evaluating achievable rate regions for this channel
when the links are assumed to be FNS and for the decode-
and-forward (DF) protocol of [9]. Here, we study a more
complex channel and also adopt a different point of view
than [4], [5]. Indeed, the game-theoretic formulation of the
problem is particularly relevant here since the users are not
only interacting because of interference in each of the two
sub-channels, but they are also assumed to be cognitive and
therefore able to observe their environment and react to it
accordingly. The system and game framework considered in
this paper are very similar to [8]. Compared to the work [8]
written by the authors, several new key results have been
obtained. First, in [8] only the amplify-and-forward (AF)
protocol is considered. Here, we have started to generalize
our approach to the decode-and-forward protocol. In contrast
to [8], we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE)
without using the time-sharing argument, which concavifies
the utilities but introduces a parameter that is not necessarily
fixed (contrarily to what is assumed in [8]). Furthermore we
prove the existence of an optimal amplification factor at the
relay and conduct an exhaustive study to illustrate how the
constraints on the transmit powers modifies the equilibrium
uniqueness analysis. We also show that the DF protocol
naturally introduces a game though the notion of cooperation
degree.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we describe
the system under investigation. Then we study the power
allocation game for two different scenarios. First we assume
that the relay implements amplify-and-forward, in Sec. III
and investigate the existence of an equilibrium state for the
corresponding game in Sec. III-A. The uniqueness of such
a state is analyzed in detail for a particular case where the
amplification gain is assumed to be fixed (Sec. III-B). In this
case, we also propose a Stackelberg formulation where the
relay is the leader of the game and can tune the amplification
gain to optimize certain performance criteria. Second, in
Sec. IV we introduce the power allocation game in the case
where the relay uses the DF protocol. In contrast with the
AF protocol, the interaction between the two users can no
longer be described only by the power allocation policies
over the two channels but another degree of freedom has to
be considered (the cooperation degrees between the sources
and the relay) and thus the game becomes more complex. In
this case we investigate the existence of the equilibrium for
two particular cases: the case of fixed cooperation degrees
between the sources and the relay (Sec. IV-B) and the case of
fixed power allocation policies over the two channels (Sec.
IV-C). Numerical results are also provided in Sec. V and
we end by several concluding remarks and open issues (Sec.
VI).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the system under investigation
comprises two source nodes S1, S2, each of them transmit-
ting its own message to its respective destination node D1 or
D2 in a certain frequency band (the notation (a) will be used
to refer to it), which is assumed to be unitary. Additionally
there is one relaying node R that is available in an additional
and non overlapping frequency band (denoted by (b)), also
unitary. The signals transmitted by S1 and S2 in the bands
(a) and (b), denoted by X(a)1 , X
(b)
1 , X
(a)
2 , X
(b)
2 , are assumed
to be independent and subject to power constraints:
∀i ∈ {1, 2},E|X(a)i |2 + E|X(b)i |2 ≤ Pi. (1)
Let us denote by θi the fraction of the power that is used for
the transmission in the band (b), such that
E|X(b)i |2 = θiPi. (2)
Under these assumptions, and denoting by gij the channel
gains between Si, Dj on band (a), the received baseband
signals write:
{
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Fig. 1. System Model.
where Z(a)i , i ∈ {1, 2}, are zero-mean additive white
Gaussian complex noises of variance N (a)i .We assume that
the system is distributed and that the two receivers treat
the interference coming from the other users as additive
noise. In this frequency band, the users achieve the following
transmissions rates:
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, R(a)i = C(η(a)i ) (4)
where C(x) = log2(1 + x) is the capacity function and
η
(a)
i =
|gii|2ρ(a)i θi
|gji|2ρ(a)j
N
(a)
j
N
(a)
i
θj + 1
, (5)
with ρ(a)i =
Pi
N
(a)
i
. We consider a realistic situation where
only large scale propagation effects can be taken into account
by the users to optimize their rates. Thus the channel
gains are considered to be static. Concerning channel state
information (CSI), we will always assume coherent com-
munications between each source-destination pair (Si,Di)
whereas at the transmitters the information assumptions
will be context-depending and therefore provided in the
corresponding sections.
In the band (b), the received baseband signals and the
achievable transmission rates, denoted by R(b)i , i ∈ {1, 2}
depend on the relaying protocol used. In what follows we
will focus on two different schemes: amplify-and-forward,
where the relay simply amplifies its observation of the
signals coming from the two sources and forwards it to
the two destinations and decode-and-forward where the relay
decodes both source messages.
III. WHEN THE RELAY IMPLEMENTS THE AF PROTOCOL
In this section we assume that the relay implements a zero-
delay scalar amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol and operates
in the full-duplex mode. Also we consider that the available
transmission power at the relay is subject to the constraint
E|X(b)r |2 ≤ Pr. Under these assumptions, and denoting by
hij , for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, the channel gains between Si, Dj
and R in band (b) respectively, the received baseband signals
write:
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The variances of the zero-mean additive white Gaussian
complex noises Z(a)i , Z
(b)
i , Z
(b)
r with i ∈ {1, 2} are denoted
by N (a)i , N
(b)
i , N
(b)
r . At last ar corresponds to the relay
amplification gain and is, in general, a function of θ1 and θ2.
As the relay is subject to a power constraint the amplification
gain ar(θ1, θ2) can not be chosen arbitrarily. By considering
ar =
√
Pr
E|Y (b)r |2
=
√
Pr
|h1r|2P1θ1+|h2r|2P2θ2+N(b)r
, one is en-
sured that the relay makes use of all its available power while
meeting the power constraint; we will denote by ar(θ1, θ2)
the value of the amplification gain when this constraint is
saturated. In Sec. III-B however, we will consider other
values for this gain. We will focus on the situation where
the gain is independent of θ1 and θ2. Two cases will be
analyzed: the case where the constant amplification gain has
to meet the power constraint, and the case where it is chosen
to optimize a certain performance criterion (possibly with no
power constraint).
Under these assumptions the transmission rate of user i ∈
{1, 2} on channel (b) when the AF protocol is used by the
relay is
R
(b)
i = C(η
(b)
i ) (7)
where
η
(b)
i =
|arhirhri + hii|2 ρ(b)i θi
|arhjrhri + hji|2 ρ(b)j
N
(b)
j
N
(b)
i
θj + a2r|hri|2N
(b)
r
N
(b)
i
+ 1
,
(8)
with ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ρ(b)i = PiN(b)i .Without loss of generality and
for sake of clarity we will assume in the sequel that ∀(i, s) ∈
{1, 2} × {a, b}, N (s)i = N (b)r = N . Also we introduce the
quantities ∀i ∈ {1, 2, r}, ρi = PiN .
A. General power allocation game
In this paper, one of our goals is to know how each
transmitter is going to allocate its available power between
the the IC and IRC, given the fact that they are able to
observe each other and react accordingly. This situation of
interaction corresponds to a game, and more precisely to a
non-cooperative strategic-form game:
• the players of the game are the two transmitters;
• the strategy of transmitter i consists in choosing θi in
its strategy set Ai = [0, 1] in order to maximize its
individual rate;
• the utility function for user i ∈ {1, 2} is its achiev-
able Shannon transmission rate given by ui(θi, θ−i) =
R
(a)
i (θi, θ−i) +R
(b)
i (θi, θ−i), where R
(a)
i and R
(b)
i are
the previously defined transmission rates.
Note that we implicitly assumed Gaussian codebooks for the
two users since this choice is optimum for both or them.
Also note that we will call state of the network the strategy
profile of the users1. In this case the state of the system is
the vector of power fractions that the users allocate to the
IRC i.e., θ = (θ1, θ2).
In distributed networks where users are selfish and free
decision makers who interact with each other, a desirable
feature is the existence of an equilibrium or a stable operating
state of the system. In this respect, the Nash equilibrium
(NE) [10] corresponds to a state of the network from which
the users do not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally,
because otherwise they would lose in terms of utility; this is
translated mathematically by the following definition.
Definition 3.1: [Nash equilibrium] The state θ∗ is a pure
NE if ∀i ∈ {1, 2},∀θ′i ∈ Ai, ui(θ∗i , θ∗−i) ≥ ui(θ′i, θ∗−i).
It turns out that the existence of such a stable state is
guaranteed the scenario under investigation.
Theorem 3.2: [Existence of an NE for the AF protocol]
At least one NE state exists for the PA game described in
Sec. I and assuming that the protocol used at the relay is
amplify and forward.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3.2 is based on Theorem
1 of [11]. In [11] Rosen provides sufficient conditions for the
existence of an NE in concave games. If, for every player
1) its strategy set is convex and compact, 2) his utility is
continuous in the vector of strategies and 3) concave in
its own strategy, then the existence of at least one NE is
guaranteed. In our setup it is easy to check that conditions
1) and 2) are met. Verifying condition 3) for the utility ui
is more involving. The second-order derivative of the utility
function ui w.r.t. θi is intractable because of the term R
(b)
i
which is a function of a rational fraction of ar(θi). It turns
out that proving that this second-order derivative is non-
positive is possible if a proper change of variables is made
before the sign analysis. This is the purpose of what follows.
First, observe that R(a)i is concave w.r.t. θi. Thus proving
that R(b)i is also concave w.r.t. θi will suffice (the sum of
two concave functions is concave). We will further consider
only user 1 and prove the concavity of R(b)1 w.r.t. θ1 (for user
2 the proof is identical). Let us denote Φ1(θ1) = 1 + η
(b)
1 .
The second derivative of R(b)1 w.r.t. θ1 can be written as
∂2R
(b)
1
∂θ21
=
Φ
′′
1Φ1 − (Φ
′
1)
2
Φ21
. In what follows we will show
that Φ
′′
1Φ1 − (Φ
′
1)
2 ≤ 0. For sake of clarity we denote by
λ = ρ1|h11|2, α = h1rhr1h11 , β = |hr1|2, γ = h21
√
θ2ρ2,
δ = h2rhr1
√
θ2ρ2, ε1 =
√
ρr
|h2r|2θ2ρ2+1 , ε2 =
|h1r|2ρ1
h22rθ2ρ2+1
,
and we define the function x(θ1) = ε1(1 + ε2θ1)−1/2. We
1The index −i is the standard notation to refer to the whole set of players
except for player i.
can now write Φ1(θ1) = f(x(θ1)) with
f (x) = 1 +
λ (1 + αx)2
(
ε21 − x2
)
ε2x2
[
(γ + δx)2 + βx2 + 1
] . (9)
The first derivative of Φ1 is given by Φ′(θ1) = dfdxx
′
and the second derivative of Φ1 is given by Φ′′(θ1) =
d2f
dx2 (x
′)2 + dfdxx
′′, where x′ and x′′ are the first and second
order derivatives of x(θ1).
Let us define the functions N (·) and D(·) that give the
numerator and the denominator of a fraction, respectively.
One can show that:
N (f ′(x)) = −2λxε2(1 + αx)
[(
αx3 + ε21
) (
(γ + δx)2
+βx2 + 1
)
+ x (1 + αx)
(
ε21 − x2
)
(δ (γ + δx) + βx)] ,
and that D1(x) , D(f ′(x)) =
ε22x
4
[
(γ + δx)2 + βx2 + 1
]2
. We note N1(x) , N (f ′(x)),
N0(x) , N (f(x)), D0(x) , D(f(x)) and then define
N2(x) , dN1
dx
and D2(x) , dD1
dx
. Considering all these
definitions we further obtain:
d2f
dx2 =
N2D1 −N1D2
D21
, (10)
and also that:
Φ
′′
1 Φ−(Φ
′
1)
2
=
N0N1
(
D1x′′ −D2(x′ )2
)
+
(N0N2D1 −N 21D0) (x′ )2
D0D21
.
To show that Φ
′′
1Φ−(Φ
′
1)
2 ≤ 0 it is sufficient to show that
both ∆1 , D1x′′ − D2(x′)2 and ∆2 , N0N2D1 − N 21D0
are negative.
One can easily verify that:
∆1 = − ε
2
2
4ε41
x9
[
5
(
δ2 + β
)
x2 + 6γδx+ γ2 + 1
][
(γ + δx)2 + βx2 + 1
]
≤ 0.
(11)
Furthermore, it can be shown that N0 ≥ 0, D0 ≥ 0, D1 ≥ 0
and that N2 ≤ 0 and thus ∆2 ≤ 0. In conclusion ∂
2R
(b)
1
∂θ21
≤ 0
and thus R(b)1 is a concave function of θ1.
What about the uniqueness of the NE? Treating this issue
properly is a tough problem and is left as an extension of this
paper. In this respect, we will further restrict our attention to
special but useful cases. Another reason for analyzing these
special cases is that they are less demanding in terms of
information required at the transmitters.
B. Case of fixed amplification gains
Although choosing ar(θ1, θ2) as above allows the relay
to exploit all its power, it involves some knowledge on the
channels at S1,S2,R and a certain relay structure, which is
not always available. In particular, it assumes at the relay
the presence of a mechanism to estimate the power of the
received signal. While this can be easy for a digital relay
transceiver that knows the possible training sequences used
by the sources, it might be impossible if the relay is imposed
to be a simple analog power amplifier without automatic
gain control (AGC). At the sources, the knowledge in terms
of channel gains (path losses) depends on the way the PA
algorithm is implemented. What matters at this point is that,
depending on the amplification gain chosen, the degree of
knowledge needed at the sources can be more or less severe.
In this section we assume that ar is a certain constant w.r.t.
θ, denoted by Ar, that meets the power constraint. In what
follows we assume Ar = ar(1, 1) which is a simple choice
meeting the relay power constraint, which can be improved
if some statistical information is available. As the case ar =
Ar is a special case of the general PA game analyzed the
existence of an NE is guaranteed thanks to Theorem 3.2.
To study the uniqueness of the NE we exploit the the
notion of best responses (BR). The BR of player i to player
j is defined by BRi(θj) = argmax
θi
ui(θ). In general it is
a correspondence but in our case it is just a function. The
equilibrium points precisely correspond to the intersection of
the BRs of the two users. In this case, using the Lagrangian
functions it can be checked that:
BRi(θj) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Fi(θj) , if 0 < Fi(θj) < 1
1 , if Fi(θj) ≥ 1
0 , otherwise ,
(12)
where j = −i and
• Fi(θj) , − cijcii θj + dicii is an affine function of θj ;
• for (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, cii = 2|gii|2|Arhrihir +
hii|2ρi;
• cij = |gji|2|Arhrihir + hii|2ρj + |gii|2|Arhrihjr +
hji|2ρj ;
• di = |Arhrihir+hii|2(1+|gii|2ρi+|gji|2ρj)−|gii|2(1+
A2r|hri|2).
If we had no constraints on θi, then the best responses
would be BRi(θj) = Fi(θj), affine functions w.r.t. θj . In
this case we would have a Cournot duopoly [12]. What is
very interesting in a Cournot duopoly is that the Cournot
taˆtonnement process is ensured to converge [13]. As the BRs
are affine functions, one is ensured that from any starting
state (θ01, θ
0
2) this procedure will converge to the unique NE,
(θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) = (θ
∗
1 , θ
∗
2) where{
θ∗1 =
c22d1−c12d2
c11c22−c12c21
θ∗2 =
c11d2−c21d1
c11c22−c12c21
(13)
represents the unique point of intersection of the two best
responses. One has to except of course the particular case
where the two lines are superposed (Fi(θj) = F−1j (θj)),
where there are an infinity of NE.
However we have to take into consideration the fact that
the strategies θi ∈ [0, 1] and thus we have to study the best
responses given in Eq. (12). It turns out that depending on
the parameters cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0, di ∈ R, there are situations
where the intersection of the curves θi = BRi(θj) is not a
unique point but a set of two or three different points which
correspond to different NE.
Theorem 3.3: For the game described in Sec. III-A and
assuming that the amplification gain at the relay is fixed,
Ar = ar(1, 1), in function of the channel parameters there
may be a unique NE, two NE, three NE or an infinity of NE.
Proof: Before discussing these situations in detail, let
us first observe that the two functions Fi(θj) are decreasing
w.r.t. θj and also Fi(0) = dicii , Fi(θ
o
j ) = 0 for θ
o
j =
di
cij
.
1) If d1 ≤ 0 and d2 ≤ 0 then the BR are constants
BRi(θj) = 0 and thus the NE is unique (θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) =
(0, 0), for all cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0.
2) If d1 ≤ 0 and d2 > 0 it can be checked that the NE is
unique for all cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0: θNE1 = 0 and
θNE2 =
∣∣∣∣ d2c22 , if d2 < c221 , otherwise.
3) If d1 > 0 and d2 ≤ 0, similarly to the previous item,
we have a unique NE for all cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0: θNE2 = 0
and
θNE1 =
∣∣∣∣ d1c11 , if d1 < c111 , otherwise.
4) If d1 > 0 and d2 > 0 we have to consider the other
parameters cii ≥ 0, cji ≥ 0.
a) If F1(1) ≥ 1 and F2(1) ≥ 1 then we have d1 ≥
c12 + c11 and d2 ≥ c21 + c22. In this case the
BR are constants BRi(θj) = 1 and thus the NE
is unique (θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) = (1, 1).
b) If F1(1) ≥ 1 and F2(1) < 1 then we have d1 ≥
c12 + c11 and d2 < c21 + c22. Here also the NE
is unique and θNE1 = 1 and
θNE2 =
∣∣∣∣ d2−c21α22 , if d2 > c220 , otherwise.
c) If F1(1) < 1 and F2(1) ≥ 1 then we have d1 <
cc12 + c11 and d2 ≥ c21 + c22. Here also the NE
is unique and θNE2 = 1 and
θNE1 =
∣∣∣∣ d1−c12c11 , if d1 > c110 , otherwise.
d) If F1(1) < 1 and F2(1) < 1 we’ll have d1 <
c12 + c11 and d2 < c21 + c22. This case is the
most demanding one and will be treated in detail
separately.
At this point an important observation is in order. The
discussed scenarios, for which we have determined the
unique NE, have a simple geometric interpretation. If the
intersection point (θ∗1 , θ
∗
2) is such that either θ
∗
1 ∈ R \ [0, 1]
or θ∗2 ∈ R\ [0, 1] then the NE is unique and differs from this
point ((θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) 6= (θ∗1 , θ∗2)). The case 4.(d) corresponds
to the case where the intersection point (θ∗1 , θ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]2 is
an NE point. Now we are interested in finding whether this
intersection point is the unique NE or are there more than
one NE. If 0 < d1 < c11 + c12 and 0 < d2 < c22 + c21 we
have the following situations:
1) If c11c22 = c21c12 then the curves described by θi =
Fi(θj) are parallel.
a) If d1 = d2 then the curves are superposed. In this
particular case we have an infinity of NE that can
be characterized by (θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) ∈ T where:
T = {(θ1, θ2) ∈ [0, 1]2 ∣∣θ1 = F1(θNE2 )} .
b) If d1 6= d2 then the two lines are only parallel. In
this case it can be checked that the NE is unique.
In order to explicit the exact relation of the NE,
one has to consider all scenarios in function of
the sign of the following four relations Fi(0)− 1
and θoj − 1. We will explicit only one of them.
Let us assume that Fi(0) − 1 < 0 and θoj < 0
which means that d1 < min{c12, c12c21c22 and d2 <
min{c21, c22}. Here we have two sub-cases:
• If d1c12 <
d2
c22
then the NE is θNE1 = 0 and
θNE2 =
d2
c22
.
• If d1c12 >
d2
c22
then the NE is θNE1 =
d1c22
c12c21
and
θNE2 = 0.
2) If c11c22 6= c21c12. Here we have to consider all cases
in function of the sign of the four relations Fi(0)− 1
and θoj − 1. We will focus on only one of them. Let
us assume that Fi(0) − 1 < 0 and θoj < 0 and thus
d1 < min{c12, c11} and d2 < min{c21, c22}. Here we
have four sub-cases:
• If d2c22 <
d1
c12
and d1c11 >
d2
c21
then the NE is unique
θNE1 = θ
∗
1 and θ
NE
2 = θ
∗
2 ,
• If d2c22 >
d1
c12
and d1c11 <
d2
c21
then there are three
different NE
(θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) ∈ {(θ∗1 , θ∗2), (0, d2c22 ), ( d1c11 , 0)}.
• If d2c22 =
d1
c12
and d1c11 <
d2
c21
then there are only two
different NE (θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) ∈ {(0, d2c22 ), ( d1c11 , 0)}.
• If d2c22 >
d1
c12
and d1c11 =
d2
c21
then there are two NE
(θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) ∈ {( d1c11 , 0), (0, d2c22 )}.
In conclusion, the cases where there are multiple NE are:
1) either when the lines θi = Fi(θj) are superposed and
the game has an infinity of NE or 2). when the lines have a
unique intersection point (θ∗1 , θ
∗
2) that lies inside [0, 1]×[0, 1].
In the latter cases there can be one, two or three different
NE.
The cases with an infinity of NE and those with two NE
can be proven to happen with probability zero when con-
sidering random channel gains with continuous probability
distributions. The NE selection issue however is beyond the
scope of this paper. A possible way to tackle this problem
would to consider hierarchical games, where one user is
assumed to be the leader of the game and chooses hits best
strategy having complete information on the strategy chosen
by its opponent [15].
So far we have considered that the amplification gain was
fixed at a certain value. Clearly, the value ar(1, 1) is feasible
in terms of power constraint but is that the best choice in
terms of achievable rates? Of one the weaknesses of the
AF protocol is that it also amplifies the noise received by
the relay. Indeed, some authors have shown that saturating
the power constraint at the relay is not always optimal [16],
[17], [18], [19] in a sense of certain performance metrics.
For example, the authors of [16] derived the best relaying
function in the sense of the raw bit error rate when no
direct link is assumed and a BPSK modulation is used at
the source and relay. In [17] an optimized relaying function
in the sense of the mutual information assuming that there
is no direct link is proposed. In [18] the authors study the
best relaying function in the sense of the minimum square
error for the frequency division relay channel and in [19]
the authors discuss the choice of the optimal amplification
gain w.r.t. the achievable rate and show that it is not always
the one saturating the relay power constraint and it strongly
depends on the channel parameters.
Here, we formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game
where the relay becomes a player and more precisely the
leader of the game. His strategy is the amplification gain
Ar ∈ [0, ar(θ1, θ2)]; the source nodes are therefore the
followers of the game. We consider two choices for the
leader’s utility: A) the rate of a given user (1 or 2), B) the
system sum-rate u(Ar) = u1
[
θNE(Ar)
]
+ u2
[
θNE(Ar)
]
.
Choice A) would correspond to the case where one of the
users would be able to choose the amplification gain whereas
B) would correspond, for example, to the case where the
system is owned by the same provider or where an agreement
between two providers would have been found. The sources
(the followers of the game) react to the leader’s strategy
by choosing their best selfish PA policies. Interestingly, we
know from Theorem 3.2 that for any location of the relay
there will be an equilibrium. The goal of the leader is to
make this equilibrium efficient in the sense of A) or B).
The first question we ask is whether there exists such an
amplification gain that maximizes the achievable transmis-
sion rates without saturating the relay power constraint. For
a simple relay channel it is easy to check that, depending on
the channel parameters, it is not always optimal to satisfy
the power constraint at the relay.
Let us consider the first situation where the leader chooses
the relay amplification factor that maximizes the transmission
rate of user i ∈ {1, 2}. We assume that the power allocations
of the two users are fixed (e.g., an NE point), (θ˜1, θ˜2). It
is straightforward to see that it will choose A∗r such that
A∗r = arg max
Ar∈[0,ar ]
R
(b)
i (Ar), with ar = ar(θ˜1, θ˜2).
Theorem 3.4: [Optimal amplification gain] The transmis-
sion rate of user i in the IRC, R(b)i (Ar), as a function of
Ar ∈ [0, ar], has two critical points: A(1)r,i = − nimi and
A
(2)
r,i = − miq
2
i+mi−piqini
miqipi−p2ini−nisi , where mi = hirhri
√
ρiθ˜i,
ni = hii
√
ρiθ˜i, pi = hjrhri
√
ρj θ˜j , qi = hji
√
ρj θ˜j ,
si = h2ri, ar = ar(θ˜1, θ˜2) and j = −i. Thus the optimal
amplification gain, A∗r = arg max
Ar∈[0,ar]
R
(b)
i (Ar), depending
on the channel parameters it takes a value in the set A∗r ∈
{0, ar, A(1)r,i , A(2)r,i }.
Proof: Using the notations given in Theorem 3.4 and
also Eq. (8) the rate R(b)i can be written as:
R
(b)
i (Ar) = log
(
1 +
(miAr + ni)2
(piAr + qi)2 + siA2r + 1
)
,
We observe that R(b)i (0) = log
(
1 + n
2
i
q2i+1
)
and that we
have a horizontal asymptote
R
(b)
i,∞ , lim
Ar→∞
R
(b)
1 (Ar) =
(
1 +
m2i
p2i + si
)
. Also the first
derivative w.r.t. Ar is
R
(b)′
i (Ar) =
(miAr + nisi)[(miqipi − p2ini − nisi)Ar +miq2i +mi − niqipi]
[(piAr + qi)2 + siA2r + 1][(miAr + ni)
2 + (piAr + qi)2 + siA2r + 1]
.
It is straightforward to see that the critical points are: A(1)r,i =
− nimi and A
(2)
r,i = − miq
2
i+mi−piqini
miqipi−p2ini−nisi .
The explicit solution, A∗r depends on the channel param-
eters and is given below.
1) If mi(miqipi − p2ini − ni) ≥ 0 then
a) if A(1)r,i ≤ 0 and A(2)r,i ≤ 0 then A∗r = ar;
b) if A(1)r,i > 0 and A
(2)
r,i ≤ 0 then
i) if ar ≥ A(1)r,i then A∗r = 0;
ii) if ar < A
(1)
r,i then
• if R(b)i (0) ≥ R(b)i (ar) then A∗r = 0;
• if R(b)i (0) < R
(b)
i (ar) then A
∗
r = ar;
c) if A(1)r,i ≤ 0 and A(2)r,i > 0 then the analysis is
similar to the previous case and A∗r ∈ {0, ar}
depending on A(2)r this time;
d) if A(1)r,i > 0 and A
(2)
r,i > 0
i) if A(1)r,i < A
(2)
r,i
A) if ar ≤ A(1)r,i then A∗r = ar;
B) if A(1)r,i < ar ≤ A(2)r,i then A∗r = A(1)r,i ;
C) if ar > A
(2)
r,i then
• if R(b)i (A
(1)
r,i ) ≥ R(b)1 (ar) then A∗r =
A
(1)
r,i ;
• if R(b)i (A
(1)
r,i ) < R
(b)
1 (ar) then A
∗
r =
ar;
ii) if A(1)r,i > A
(2)
r,i then the analysis is similar
to the previous case, exchanging the roles of
A
(1)
r,i and A
(2)
r,i ;
iii) if A(1)r,i = A
(2)
r,i then A
∗
r = ar.
2) If mi(miqipi − p2ini − ni) < 0 then
a) if A(1)r,i ≤ 0 and A(2)r,i ≤ 0 then A∗r = 0;
b) if A(1)r,i > 0 and A
(2)
r,i ≤ 0 then
i) if ar ≥ A(1)r,i then A∗r = ar;
ii) if ar > A
(1)
r,i then A
∗
r = A
(1)
r,i ;
c) if A(1)r,i ≤ 0 and A(2)r,i > 0 then the analysis is
similar to the previous case and A∗r ∈ {ar, A(1)r,i }
depending on A(2)r,i this time;
d) if A(1)r,i > 0 and A
(2)
r,i > 0
i) if A(1)r,i < A
(2)
r,i
A) if ar ≤ A(1)r,i then A∗r = 0;
B) if A(1)r,i < ar ≤ A(2)r,i then
• if R(b)i (0) ≥ R(b)i (ar) then A∗r = 0;
• if R(b)i (0) < R
(b)
i (ar) then A
∗
r = ar;
C) if ar > A
(2)
r,i then
• if R(b)i (A
(2)
r,i ) ≥ R(b)i (0) then A∗r =
A
(2)
r,i ;
• if R(b)i (A
(2)
r,i ) < R
(b)
i (0) then A
∗
r = 0;
ii) if A(1)r,i > A
(2)
r,i then the analysis is similar
to the previous case, exchanging the roles of
A
(1)
r,i and A
(2)
r,i ;
iii) if A(1)r,i = A
(2)
r,i then A
∗
r = 0.
We observe that, depending on the channel parameters, it
is not always optimal to saturate the power constraint at the
relay.
Now we consider the case where the strategy of the leader
is to choose the amplification gain that maximizes the sum-
rate of the network. It is straightforward to see that it will
choose A∗r = argmax{R(b)1 (Ar) + R(b)2 (Ar)}. In order to
simplify the analysis we use similar notations as the previous
case. Let us denote by R(b)1 (Ar) +R
(b)
2 (Ar) = E(Ar)
E(Ar) =
2∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
(miAr + ni)2
(piAr + qi)2 + siA2r + 1
)
,
w.r.t. Ar ∈ [0, ar] where the parameters are identical to
the ones defined in Theorem 3.4. We observe that
E(0) = log
(
1 +
n21
q21 + 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
n22
q22 + 1
)
and that we have a horizontal asymptote
E∞ , lim
Ar→∞
E(Ar) =
(
1 +
m21
p21 + q1
)
+
(
1 +
m22
p22 + q2
)
.
In this case, it is not easy to obtain closed-form expres-
sions of the optimal amplification gain (in order to find the
critical points of E one has to solve a six degree equation).
This is why numerical results will be provided to illustrate
the fact it is not always optimal to saturate the relay power
constraint.
IV. WHEN THE RELAY IMPLEMENTS THE DF PROTOCOL
In this section we consider a different relaying proto-
col, the decode-and-forward scheme [9]. Here, the relay
decodes the messages sent by the two information sources.
In Gaussian relay channels, this protocol can lead to better
performance in terms of achievable rates than the AF and EF
protocols; this typically occurs in practice when the relay
is close to the source in comparison with the destination
[14]. The principle of the DF protocol is detailed in [9]
and here we just give the main idea behind it. Consider a
Gaussian relay channel for which the source-relay link has
a better quality than the source-destination link. From each
information message, the source builds a coarse and a fine
message. With these two messages the source superposes
two codewords. The rates associated with these codewords
(or messages) are such that the relay can decode both of
them reliably while the destination can only decode the
coarse message. After decoding this message, the destination
can subtract the corresponding signal and try to decode the
fine message. To help the destination to do so, the relay
cooperates with the source by sending some information
about the fine message. We will see a little further that
the cooperation degree between the source and relay can
be measured in terms of correlation between two random
variables. The intuition being that if the source only sends
a fine message, the cooperation degree is 1 while if it sends
only a coarse message, it is 0. The transmission rate over the
relay channel is maximized, in general, for an intermediate
value of the cooperation degree.
The received baseband signals write
Y
(b)
r = h1rX
(b)
1 + h2rX
(b)
2 + Zr
Y
(b)
1 = h11X
(b)
1 + hr1X
(b)
r1 + h21X
(b)
2 + hr1X
(b)
r2 + Z
(b)
1
Y
(b)
2 = h22X
(b)
2 + hr2X
(b)
r2 + h12X
(b)
1 + hr2X
(b)
r1 + Z
(b)
2
where X(b)r1 ∼ N (0, νPr), X(b)r2 ∼ N (0, (1− ν)Pr) and the
other power constraints are given in Sec. II. The parameter
ν ∈ [0, 1] is chosen by the relay to share its available power
between the codewords that it transmits to the two receivers.
The achievable rates region on the IRC is given by:
R
(b)
1 ≤ min
{
I(X(b)1 ;Yr|X(b)2 , X(b)r1 , X(b)r2 ),
I(X(b)1 , X
(b)
r1 ;Y
(b)
1 )
}
R
(b)
2 ≤ min
{
I(X(b)2 ;Yr|X(b)1 , X(b)r1 , X(b)r2 ),
I(X(b)2 , X
(b)
r2 ;Y
(b)
2 )
}
R
(b)
1 +R
(b)
2 ≤ I(X(b)1 , X(b)2 ;Yr|Xr1, Xr2),
(14)
where the first terms in the first two inequalities and the third
inequality correspond to the decoding constraint at the relay.
Note that the transmission between both source nodes and
the relay is equivalent to a Multiple Access Channel (MAC)
for which the capacity region is fully characterized. Here we
assume that the destination implements single-user decoding.
There are many motivations for this choice, here we just
give two of them. It is a realistic assumption in a framework
where devices operate in unlicensed band in a priori non-
coordinated manner. It allows us to cope with the constraint
on the MAC sum-rate, which would make the game more
complex to be played and is therefore left as an extension
of this paper. The corresponding rate pair is characterized
by the fact that, in the decoding step of a source’s message
at the relay, the other source’s signal is treated as additive
noise. Therefore, a rate pair achievable by the IRC is given
by

R
(b)
1 = min{I(X(b)1 ;Yr|X(b)r1 , X(b)r2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
(b)
1,1
, I(X
(b)
1 , X
(b)
r1 ;Y
(b)
1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
(b)
1,2
}
R
(b)
2 = min{I(X(b)2 ;Yr|X(b)r1 , X(b)r2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
(b)
2,1
, I(X
(b)
2 , X
(b)
r2 ;Y
(b)
2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
(b)
2,2
} , (15)
where
R
(b)
1,1 = C
(
h21r(1−τ1)θ1P1
h22r(1−τ2)θ2P2+Nr
)
R
(b)
2,1 = C
(
h22r(1−τ2)θ2P2
h21r(1−τ1)θ1P1+Nr
)
R
(b)
1,2 = C
(
h211θ1P1+h
2
r1νPr+2h11hr1
√
τ1θ1P1νPr
h221θ2P2+h
2
r1ν¯Pr+2h21hr1
√
τ2θ2P2ν¯Pr+N
(b)
1
)
R
(b)
2,2 = C
(
h222θ2P2+h
2
r2ν¯Pr+2h22hr2
√
τ2θ2P2ν¯Pr
h212θ1P1+h
2
r2νPr+2h12hr2
√
τ1θ1P1νPr+N
(b)
2
)
with (ν, τ1, τ2) ∈ [0, 1]3 , i ∈ {1, 2}, and ν¯ = 1 − ν. In the
coding strategy used to achieve these rates, the cooperation
degree between the source node Si and relay node is defined
as follows:
τi =
E[X(b)i X
(b)∗
ri ]√
E[|X(b)i |2]E[|X(b)ri |2]
. (16)
In fact we can rewrite X(b)i as X
(b)
i = X
(b)
i0 +
τiPi
νiPr
Xri where
the codewords X(b)i0 and Xri are independent with X
(b)
i0 ∼
N (0, (1− τi)Pi) and ν1 = ν and ν2 = ν¯; the first term
X
(b)
i0 represents the coarse message while the second term
corresponds to the fine message. In comparison to the AF
case, these cooperation degrees represent a supplementary
degree of freedom that each source node can use in the
maximization of its individual rate. The achievable rates on
the IC are given in Sec. II and the global achievable rates at
the receiver nodes are therefore given by Ri = R
(a)
i +R
(b)
i .
A. General power allocation game
As we have mentioned in the previous section, the cooper-
ation degree τi, has to be considered. If we assume that these
parameters are chosen at the transmitters then the interaction
between the two users is characterized by both: their power
allocation policies between the the IC and IRC θi and also
by their cooperation degrees with the relay node τi. In this
case we formulate the game in the following way.
• the players of the game are the two transmitters;
• the strategy of transmitter i consists in choosing the
vector (θi, τi) in its strategy set Ai = [0, 1] × [0, 1] in
order to maximize its individual transmission rate Ri;
• the utility function for user i ∈ {1, 2} is its achievable
Shannon transmission rate on both frequency bands
given by ui((θi, τi), (θ−i, τ−i)) = R
(a)
i + R
(b)
i , where
R
(b)
i are the transmission rates defined in Eq. (15).
In this case the state of the network becomes the quadruplet
(θ1, τ1, θ2, τ2).The existence of the NE is more difficult to
be dealt with. We will have to consider more advanced
mathematical tools to prove the existence in this case. In what
follows we focus on two particular cases: the case of fixed
cooperation degrees and the case of fixed power allocation
policies among the two channels.
B. Case of fixed cooperation degrees
In this case we assume that the cooperation degrees
(τ1, τ2) are fixed and only the power allocation policy can be
optimized by the sources. This assumption is realistic if we
consider that not the transmitters but the relay has the control
over these cooperation degrees (the MAC (S1,S2)−R can
be view as a centralized network in which the relay node
chooses the operating point on the MAC capacity region).
The users react accordingly to the choice of the relay node.
Now, for user i, the remaining degree of freedom in the
maximization of its individual rate is the power fraction θi
that it allocates to the IRC. The game is a power allocation
game very similar to the AF case. It turns out that in this
case the existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed.
Theorem 4.1: [Existence of an NE for the DF protocol]
There will always be an NE in the power allocation game
described assuming that the relaying protocol is decode-and-
forward and that the cooperation degrees are fixed.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is also based on
Theorem 1 of [11]. In contrast with the case of AF, the utility
function of the user i is the minimum between two rates.
Hence, proving the concavity of these two rate functions
w.r.t. θi implies the concavity of ui (the min function of
two concave functions is also concave).
The uniqueness issue is however more difficult to be dealt
with properly for the same reasons given for the general
power allocation game with the AF protocol.
Due to the fact that the relay chooses the cooperation
degrees, we can propose a Stackelberg formulation to model
the game, similar to Sec. III-B. The relay is the leader of
the game and it can tune its strategy (τ1, τ2) to optimize a
certain performance criteria.
C. Case of fixed power allocation policies
We now suppose that the power fractions θ1 and θ2 allo-
cated to the IRC are fixed (for example θ1 = 12 and θ2 =
1
2 ).
This scenario is realistic if there is not a feedback mechanism
that could help the sources to obtain the interference levels
their receivers see on band (a). Assuming the presence of
such a mechanism on band (b) is more realistic due to
the presence of the relay node that could manage the CSI
acquisition. For user i, the remaining degree of freedom in
the maximization of its individual rate is its cooperation
degree τi with the relay node. We want to know if there
exists an NE for this PA game. The answer is given in the
theorem below.
Theorem 4.2: [Existence of an NE for the DF protocol]
At least one NE exists in the power allocation game assuming
the decode-and-forward protocol and also that the power
allocation policies over the two channels are fixed.
Proof: The proof of this theorem also relies on Theorem
1 of [11]. It is easy to check that, for the user i, the two rates
functions in the utility function are concave w.r.t. τi hence
the utility function ui is also concave w.r.t. τi.
Just like in the previous case, the uniqueness issue is
however more difficult to be dealt with properly. As an
extension of the general power allocation, we could consider
a Stackelberg formulation for which the relay node is the
leader of the game and it chooses its power sharing factor
ν ∈ [0, 1] to maximize a certain performance criteria. The
users will react accordingly to the value of this parameter.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we focus our attention on the amplify-and-
forward relaying protocol, the case where the amplification
gain is constant. Also we assume that the channel gains gij
and hij , i, j ∈ {1, 2} are real variables.
First, we study the best response functions defined in Sec.
III-B (see Eq. 12) to illustrate the theoretical analysis we
conducted for the determination of the possible equilibria
states. In Fig. 2 we plot the best response functions for
the following scenario: ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 3, ρr = 2 and the
channel gains (g11, g12, g21, g22) = (−1.7, 4.31, 8.35, 1.37),
(h11, h12, h21, h22) = (1.89, 4.72, 0.2,−0.2) and
(h1r, h2r, hr1, hr2)
= (−2.5, 3.23, 5.58, 3.77). The intersection point of the
curves Fi(θj) = θi is (θ∗1 , θ
∗
2) = (0.84, 0.66) ∈ [0, 1]2 and
thus is an NE point. We further observe that this point is not
the only equilibrium and that there are two more NE: (0, 1),
(1, 0.37). In Fig. 3 we plot the best response functions for
the following scenario: ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 3, ρr = 2 and the
channel gains (g11, g12, g21, g22) = (5.29, 2.89, 3.36,−1.16),
(h11, h12, h21, h22) = (3.79, 2.54, 0.38, 6.55) and
(h1r, h2r, hr1, hr2) = (−3.18, 1.67,−1.11, 1.25). The in-
tersection point of the curves Fi(θj) = θi is (θ∗1 , θ
∗
2) =
(0.25, 1, 39) /∈ [0, 1]2 and thus it is not an equilibrium. In this
case the NE is unique and given by (θNE1 , θ
NE
2 ) = (0.49, 1).
Second, we consider the maximization of the over-
all network sum-rate as a function of the amplification
gain at the relay. In Fig. 4 we plot the sum E(Ar) =
R
(b)
1 + R
(b)
2 as a function of Ar ∈ [0, ar] for the
fixed power allocation policies (θ1, θ2) = (0.5, 0.5),
ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 3, ρr = 2 and the channel
gains (h11, h12, h21, h22) = (5.51, 1.53, 0.36,−0.87) and
(h1r, h2r, hr1, hr2) = (−2.63, 2.91,−1.96, 2.44) and fixed
(θ˜1, θ˜2) = (0.5, 0.5). We observe that choosing the amplifi-
cation gain equal to ar = 0.34 (saturating the constraint) is
not optimal and A∗r = 0.04 < ar.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a channel model which
is very useful to study scenarios where each wireless device
operating on unlicensed bands is offered the opportunity to
exploit additional resources to increase its own transmission
rate. Here the additional resources consist of spectrum plus
cooperation power. We have analyzed in detail the problem
of decentralized power allocation for two important classes
of relaying protocols (AF and DF) and shown the existence
of predictable states for the network. This is very interesting
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Fig. 2. Amplify-and-Forward, case of fixed amplification gain. The Best
Response Functions. The intersection point (θ∗1 , θ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]2. There are
three different NE points.
since it shows how selfish users self-regulate to reach an
equilibrium. Unfortunately, we have seen that even for the
simple case of the AF protocol, the equilibrium is not unique.
The effective equilibrium reached after Cournot taˆtonnement
depends on the network initial state. This shows the inter-
est in designing physical mechanisms to give incentive to
users to converge towards a given equilibrium or finding
agreements between operators and manufacturers deploying
wireless devices in a non-coordinated manner. We have also
seen that the DF protocol naturally introduces a game, even
when the power allocation policy is fixed at each source,
through the concept of cooperation degree between the
sources and relay. At last we have seen that our problem can
also be formulated as a Stackelberg game when some key
parameters need to be optimized namely: the amplification
gain used by the relay when AF is assumed, the power
allocation at the relay (between the two relayed signals),
the relay location. In these cases, the relay becomes a
player of the game (leader). We have not treated all these
issues here for obvious reasons of space but we already
know that the best strategy of the relay is not to transmit
with its maximum available power. There is a certain value
of the amplification gain that corresponds to the optimum
trade-off between cooperation and noise amplification and
maximize its utility (e.g., individual transmission rate of a
user or system sum-rate). From a broader perspective, many
extensions of this work have been proposed, which should
help to better analyze the general problem of competition in
cooperative channels.
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